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 Once universally accepted under common law, a widow’s dower rights are now only 
preserved in a handful of states.1  Even in those states, widowers have generally been granted a 
reciprocal right in their wives’ property.2  Michigan is currently the only state which provides 
dower rights exclusively to women.3  Michigan’s dower law has thus far survived challenges in 
the courts and in the legislature.4  Should it continue to stand, or is there a reason why no other 
state in the nation still follows common law? 
 The main issue is whether Michigan’s statute is even constitutional.  Although the 
Michigan Supreme Court in 2008 refused to hear an appeal that sought to overturn the law, it is 
not clear that the court made the right decision.5  The proponent of the dower statute has the 
burden of demonstrating that the statute is substantially related to an important government 
interest.6  Other state courts considering similar laws have been split on the issue, and no state 
other than Michigan has upheld a gender-discriminatory dower law since 1977.7   
 Although Michigan’s dower statute serves the important purposes of supporting needy 
spouses and remedying past economic discrimination against women, it is not substantially 
related to those purposes.8  The statute is vastly over-inclusive while at the same time being 
significantly under-inclusive.9  Furthermore, the law no longer effectively assists those people to 
                                                 
1 JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 476 n. 1 (8th ed. 2009) 
(reporting that common law dower rights survive only in Ohio, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Michigan). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 In re Estate of Miltenberger, 753 N.W.2d 219, 223-24 (2008). 
5 Id. at 901. 
6 See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-51 (1980) (stating the standard of review and 
noting that the party seeking to uphold the statute has the burden of showing that the statute passes intermediate 
scrutiny). 
7 Compare Stokes v. Stokes, 613 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1981) and Boan v. Watson, 316 S.E.2d 401 (S.C. 1984) (both 
holding dower laws unconstitutional) with In re Baer Estate, 562 P.2d 614, 615-617 (Utah, 1977) and In re Rincon 
Estate, 327 So.2d 224 (Fla., 1976) (both upholding dower laws).  
8 See infra, Part II. 
9 See infra, Section II.B. 
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whom it does apply.10  The nature of wealth has changed, so widows in Michigan generally 
receive more compensation from their husband’s will or from Michigan’s elective share statute.11  
Nor can Michigan’s discriminatory statute be justified by a lack of gender-neutral alternatives, 
since there is in fact a variety of gender neutral options.12 
Michigan’s dower statute is most likely unconstitutional because it is no longer 
substantially related to an important government purpose.13  Even if courts do not abolish dower 
in Michigan, the legislature can and should take the initiative to replace the law with a more 
effective measure. 
 Part I of this paper explains in more detail the origin and operation of the dower law.  
Part II examines the case law and determines that Michigan’s dower provision most likely 
violates the state and federal constitutions.  Part III considers the Uniform Probate Code’s 
elective share as an alternative to Michigan’s current law, and finds that the UPC serves the same 
purposes as Michigan’s dower statute, but does so more effectively and without discriminating 
on the basis of gender. 
I. Background 
 The dower right was originally a common law creation.14  During feudal times, property 
passed via prima geniture from the husband to the eldest son, and real estate was the primary 
source of wealth.15  Dower provided a method of supporting a man’s wife and children after his 
death.16  The widow took a life estate in one third of the real property owned by her husband 
                                                 
10 See infra, Section II.B. 
11 Margaret A. Meyers, Willard G. Moseng, and Clarence A. Stone, Dower: Important Protection or Sexist 
Anachronism, 23 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 5, 10 (1996). 
12 See infra, Part III. 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 THOMAS E. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 104 (2d ed. 1953). 
15 George L. Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REV. 42, 47 (1948). 
16 Id.  The eldest son could not always be counted upon to fill this need because high mortality rates in child birth 
meant that a man’s widow frequently was not the mother of his eldest son.  Meyers, supra note 11, at 6. 
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during the marriage, from which she could support herself.17  This right attached to more than 
just the land held by the husband at his death. The wife retained dower rights even in property 
that the husband disposed of, unless she signed off on the transfer of the property as well.18  The 
wife’s right to dower remained inchoate until the death of her husband, at which point the rights 
attached.19 
 Statutory forms of dower in Michigan stretch as far back as an ordinance from 1787.20  
The 1787 ordinance actually provided for the widow to receive a life estate in one third of her 
spouse’s personal property as well as the traditional life estate in a third of his real property.21  
Later statutes once again removed the right to take personal property.22  Early forms of dower 
were justified partly by the fact that women could not own their own property while they were 
married, and thus could not build up any independent resources.23  The state legislature gave 
women the right to own their own property in the mid-1800s, but merely ending coverture did 
not put women on an even economic footing with men.  Thus, the legislature continued to retain 
dower as a means of supporting widows.24   
 By 1961, though, some of the delegates to Michigan’s constitutional convention favored 
abolishing dower because in most cases it no longer provided the most support for the widow.25 
In the end, the majority chose not to abolish dower because it still provided the most protection 
in cases where the husband attempted to completely disinherit his wife by transferring away 
                                                 
17 Haskins, supra note 17 at 48-49. 
18 See, e.g., In re Estate of Shroh, 392 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).  
19 Meyers, supra note 11 at 5. 
20 May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. 1 (1847). 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 558.1.  
23 Meyers, supra note 9, at 6. 
24 Id.  
25 Miltenberger, 753 N.W.2d 219, 223 (2008). 
4 
 
property without her consent.26  Thus, the Michigan Constitution states that “[d]ower may be 
relinquished or conveyed as provided by law.”27  
 Most recently, the Michigan Legislature dealt with dower as part of its project to update 
Michigan’s probate code in 1998.28  The legislature modeled the new statute, Estates and 
Protected Individuals Code (hereinafter EPIC), on the Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter 
UPC).29  The UPC explicitly abolished dower, leaving a widow with the option to accept her 
share under her spouse’s will or through intestacy, or to claim her elective share.30  The 
Michigan legislature chose not to follow the UPC in this instance however, and instead enshrined 
dower in the new probate code.31  The statute states: 
The widow of every deceased person, shall be entitled to dower, or the use during 
her natural life, of 1/3 part of all the lands whereof her husband was seized of an 
estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage, unless she is lawfully 
barred thereof. 
 
 When a husband dies, the widow has three choices under Michigan law. The first choice 
is to take what is left to her in the husband’s will, or if he has no will to take what passes to her 
through intestacy, which is a type of default-will provided by the law.32  The amount of the 
intestate share varies depending on what surviving relatives both the husband and the wife have, 
but the minimum is for the widow to take the first $100,000 of the estate plus half of the 
remainder.33  Note that this assumes the estate contains more than $100,000 after the decedent’s 
creditors have been paid off. 
                                                 
26 Id. at 905-06. 
27 MICH. CONST. 1963, art. 10, § 1. 
28 1998 P.A. 386. 
29 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1101, et seq.; see also Miltenberger, 753 N.W.2d at 224 (explaining that EPIC 
generally follows the lead of the UPC). 
30 UPC § 2-112 (abolishing dower and curtesy); § 2-202 (the UPC’s elective share provision).  
31 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 558.1. 
32 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2202. 
33 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2102. 
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The second choice is for the widow to take her elective share.34  Michigan’s elective 
share provides the surviving spouse with one half of what she would have received if her 
husband had died without a will, reduced by one half of the value of any property the surviving 
spouse received from her husband outside of the will or intestacy.35  Therefore, under the 
elective share, the minimum the surviving spouse will receive is $50,000 plus one quarter of the 
remaining estate, minus half of any other property transferred to her outside of the will.36  For 
example, if the couple owned a house together, the surviving spouse receives the decedent’s 
share of the house automatically; it does not pass through the will or intestacy.  Half the value of 
the house would then be deducted from the surviving spouse’s elective share.   
Michigan’s elective share provision also differs from the UPC.  The UPC elective share 
provision provides for a surviving spouse (male or female) to take a percentage of the 
“augmented estate,” with the percentage gradually increasing to 50% for spouses who were 
married 15 years or longer.37  Furthermore, the augmented estate under the UPC includes 
property transferred outside of probate, including some transactions while the decedent was still 
alive.38  Michigan’s elective share provision, on the other hand, operates only against the 
property in the probate estate.39  The most important difference here is that by including non-
probate transfers in the augmented estate, jurisdictions which employ the UPC’s elective share 
provision protect spouses from disinheritance by making it much harder to pass assets in a way 
that escapes the reach of the elective share.  
                                                 
34 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2202. 
35 Id. 
36 Since property transferred outside the will only counts against the elective share for half its value, any non-probate 
transfers to the surviving spouse will decrease the elective share itself, but increase the overall amount of property 
received by the surviving spouse.  Again, note that the surviving spouse will receive less than $50,000 if there is less 
than $50,000 in the decedent’s estate. 
37 UPC § 2-205. 
38 Id. 
39 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2202. 
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The last choice for a widow in Michigan is to exercise her dower rights to a lifetime 
interest in one third of the lands the husband possessed during the marriage.40  This right attaches 
to all real property which the husband held during the marriage, even if he transferred it before 
his death, unless the widow also released her dower interest.41  The widow’s dower can be 
assigned to her by dividing the husband’s land and giving her a life estate in one third of it, 
through a division of the rents from the property, or by selling the property and giving her a third 
of the proceeds.42   
 Dower attaches only to real property, but most wealth today is held in various forms of 
personal property, such as stocks, retirement accounts, and insurance policies.  Therefore, a 
widow generally gets more through the husband’s will or through her elective share than through 
dower.43 However, dower does provide some protection against the husband transferring away 
property in order to disinherit the wife, because the husband cannot destroy the wife’s dower 
interest.44  
II. Constitutionality 
 Both the Michigan and Federal constitutions require that no person be denied the equal 
protection of the laws.45  The Michigan Supreme Court has held that Michigan’s Equal 
Protection Clause is coterminous with the federal Equal Protection Clause, so the same analysis 
applies to both of them.46  The fundamental idea of the Equal Protection Clause is that when a 
statute separates people into different classes, that classification must rest on criteria that are 
                                                 
40 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2202; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 558.1. 
41 In re Estate of Shroh, 392 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). “No contract of sale or conveyance by a 
husband without his wife's signature will operate to divest her of her dower.”  Id. 
42 25 AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy § 32 (2010). 
43 Meyers, supra note 11 at 7. 
44 Shroh, 392 N.W.2d at 194. 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. I, § 2. 
46 Doe v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 439 Mich. 650, 672 (1992). 
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related to the purpose of the statute.47  However, courts subject certain types of classifications to 
stricter scrutiny than others.48  In considering dower, the problem is not which test to apply, but 
what the outcome of that test should be.  The Supreme Courts of several states have applied 
Equal Protection analysis to similar statutes, but although they generally agreed on which test to 
apply, their conclusions have diverged widely.49 
 The dower statute is a classification on the basis of gender, because it allows widows to 
take a one third interest in all lands held by their husbands during the marriage, but does not 
allow a reciprocal right for widowers.50  Precedent is clear that when a statute makes 
classifications based on gender, the statute “must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”51  More recently, the federal 
Supreme Court stated that the justification for the statute must also be genuine, not created in 
response to litigation, and it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the differences 
between men and women.52 
A. We Agree on the Question, But Not the Answer: Dower Statute Case Law 
 The first state court to consider the constitutionality of a dower law was the Florida 
Supreme Court, which decided In re Rincon Estate in 1976.53  Louise Rincon died on March 5, 
1973.54  At that time, the Florida probate code provided dower for widows, but not widowers.55  
However, Ms. Rincon’s widower was not satisfied with the provisions of her will, and attempted 
                                                 
47 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). 
48 See, e.g., Miltenberger, 753 N.W.2d 219, 235 (2008) (Corrigan, J., concurring) (noting that laws that discriminate 
based on race are subject to stricter scrutiny than laws that discriminate based on gender). 
49 Compare Stokes v. Stokes, 613 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1981) and Boan v. Watson, 316 S.E.2d 401 (S.C. 1984) (both 
holding dower laws unconstitutional) with In re Baer Estate, 562 P.2d 614, 615-617 (Utah, 1977) and In re Rincon 
Estate, 327 So.2d 224 (Fla., 1976) (both upholding dower laws). 
50 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 588.1. 
51 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977); Wengler v. 
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). 
52 U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
53 Rincon, 327 So.2d 224. 
54 Id. at 225. 
55 Id. at 225-26. 
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to elect to take dower under a new statute that took effect on October 1, 1973, which did allow 
husbands to have dower rights.56  Mr. Rincon argued that the old provision was unconstitutional, 
and that the new one should be applied to him retroactively.57   
The Florida Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments, but under a standard which 
differed slightly from the test which prevails today.58  Regarding the Equal Protection analysis, 
the court stated that a statute differentiating between married men and married women would 
pass muster if it “rest[ed] on some ground of reasonable difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation.”59  The court took this language from the federal 
Supreme Court case of Kahn v. Shevin.60 The court properly required a substantial relation 
between the classification and the goal of the statute, but instead of requiring an important 
government objective the court instead asked if the classification was based on “some ground of 
reasonable difference.”61   
The court then went on to find that the classification was rooted in the disparity between 
men and women’s economic capabilities.62  The federal Supreme Court in Kahn v. Shevin upheld 
a gender classification that aimed at reducing the disparity between men and women’s economic 
capabilities, and it appears that may have been what the Rincon court was getting at.63  The 
federal Supreme Court has since upheld reducing the economic disparity between men and 
women as an important government purpose, so if the Rincon court had applied the modern 
analysis it would almost certainly have reached the same conclusion.64  
                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 226. 
60 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). 
61 Rincon, 327 So.2d at 226. 
62 Id. 
63 416 U.S. at 355. 
64 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 
9 
 
The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Matter of Parson’s Estate in 
1976, when a widower sued to recover the statutory allowance granted to widows.65  Riley 
Parson argued that the statutes which provided for a widow’s allowance and family allowance 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.66  The Parson court applied the same standard as the 
Rincon court.67  In upholding the statute, the Parson court quoted Kahn v. Shevin to the effect 
that “[t]here can be no dispute” that single women face greater financial difficulties than single 
men, and “[w]hether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-
dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid 
jobs.”68  The court held that the classification in the statute was substantially related to the goal 
of reducing this economic inequality.69 
Following in the same vein, the Utah Supreme Court upheld another gender-based statute 
in the 1977 case of Matter of Baer’s Estate.70  This case involved a statutory dower provision 
that provided widows with a right to elect against the will, but not widowers.71  The Utah 
Supreme Court followed similar reasoning to the Parson court, finding that there was a grave 
disparity between the economic abilities of men and women, and reducing this disparity through 
application of dower was a legitimate government purpose.72  The court noted that in many cases 
widows found themselves forced into a job market with which they were unfamiliar, and for 
                                                 
65 344 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). 
66 Id. at 581-82. 
67 Id. at 584-85. 
68 Id. at 584. 
69 Id. at 585. 
70 562 P.2d 614 (Utah 1977). It is interesting to note that in Parson, Rincon, and Baer, the respective state legislature 
had already replaced the challenged statutes with gender neutral statutes before the cases were decided. Id. at 616; 
Parson, 344 N.E.2d at 585 n.1; Rincon, 327 So.2d at 226. 
71 Id. at 615. 
72 Id. at 615-16. 
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which they were unqualified because of their previous economic dependence on their 
husbands.73 
In 1981, the Arkansas Supreme Court became the first state court to strike down dower as 
unconstitutional in the case of Stokes v. Stokes.74  The court held that it could not see any 
government function in Arkansas’s dower statutes.75  Unfortunately, the court did not report 
what, if any, government purposes it had considered and rejected.76  Rather, the court limited its 
rationale to pointing out that dower gave women rights that their husbands did not possess, thus 
making a gender-based classification.77 
The Stokes court claimed to rely on Orr v. Orr, a U.S. Supreme Court case, in striking 
down dower.78  Orr, though, does not perfectly fit the dower cases.  In Orr, a husband challenged 
an Alabama statute under which husbands, but not wives, could be forced to pay alimony after a 
divorce.79  The court stated that the statute must be substantially related to achieving an 
important government purpose, then considered three possible purposes the statute might serve.80  
First the court held that a goal of reinforcing a family model in which women play a dependent 
role is not permissible.81 
The other purposes that the court considered were supporting needy spouses and 
compensating women for past discrimination during marriage.82  The court found each of these 
goals to be important government objectives.83  However, the court held that the statute was not 
                                                 
73 Id. at 616. 
74 613 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1981). 
75 Id. at 304-05. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at  304 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)). 
79 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
80 Id. at 279. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 280. 
83 Id. 
11 
 
substantially related to meeting these valid objectives.84  First, if the statute aimed at aiding 
needy spouses, then it was using gender as a proxy for need, since only wives could receive 
alimony.85  The court found it unnecessary to consider whether gender served as an adequate 
proxy for need in this instance because a better mechanism already existed.86  The divorce 
process in Alabama included an individualized hearing to determine the parties’ relative financial 
circumstances.87  Thus, the courts already had all the information necessary to determine who 
needed financial assistance, and so it was not necessary to use gender as a proxy for need.88  
Similarly, those hearings could reveal more accurately than a wife’s gender whether or not she 
had been subject to discrimination during the course of her marriage.89  “A gender-based 
classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates additional benefits only for 
those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny.”90 
Orr is not perfectly on point for the dower cases, because probate of an estate does not 
involve a determination of the financial status of the decedent’s heirs.91  Therefore, the Stokes 
case is not helpful because it did not acknowledge the factual distinction, and did not provide any 
independent justification for overruling dower aside from the reference to Orr.  Unfortunately, 
Stokes is not the only case with this infirmity. 
In 1984, the South Carolina Supreme Court held in Boan v. Watson that Orr invalidated 
the right of dower, which in South Carolina still rested on a common law basis.92  The court 
stated that Orr deals with the property rights of husbands and wives upon divorce, and therefore 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 281. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 281-82. 
90 Id. at 282. 
91 Miltenberger, 753 N.W.2d 219, 230 (2008). 
92 316 S.E.2d 401, 402-03 (S.C. 1984). This is another case that was not decided until a law had been passed 
eliminating dower, or at least making it gender neutral.  Id. at  
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should be equally applicable to their property rights upon death.93  There is nothing wrong with 
this logic, as far as it goes, but the Boan court, like the Stokes court, failed to recognize that the 
Orr decision rested in part upon the fact that a divorce court already determined the financial 
status of the parties before it, allowing it to achieve the alimony statute’s goals without 
discriminating on the basis of gender.94  The Boan court thus did not explain why exactly dower 
is not substantially related to an important government purpose. 
The Alabama Supreme Court provided a more satisfying analysis in Hall v. McBride.95  
In Hall, Mary Hall dissented from her husband’s will and attempted to take dower.96  Mrs. Hall 
had lived apart from her husband for the previous sixteen or seventeen years, and had filed as 
single on her last two tax returns.97  The Alabama Supreme Court applied the modern version of 
the Equal Protection test, requiring the dower statute be substantially related to an important 
government purpose, and noting that statutes that make overbroad generalizations based on 
gender will generally be struck down.98 
The Hall court noted that the purpose of Alabama’s statute was to protect a widow from 
being left with little or no means of support by her husband upon his death.99  The court then 
stated that one goal of the statute was clearly based on notions of romantic paternalism, because 
it assumed that women’s roles as wives and mothers left them financially helpless.100  This, the 
                                                 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 403-04 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting); see also supra, notes 74-85 and accompanying text.  
95 416 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1982). This is another case in which the state legislature had already adopted a gender neutral 
statute which simply had not taken effect before the husband died.  Garrison, Kevin R., The Ins and Outs of the 
Alabama Elective Share, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1161, 1166 (2007). 
96 416 So.2d at 988. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 989. 
100 Id. 
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court stated, announced the government’s preference for wives to play a dependent role.101  Such 
a purpose is not permissible, so the court moved on to consider other possible purposes. 
The court found that the dower statute could serve to reduce the economic disparity 
between men and women that resulted from the history of discrimination against women, or to 
assist needy spouses.102  Both of these purposes are legitimate, so the court moved on to consider 
whether the statute bore a substantial relation to these purposes.103   
First, the court held that gender is not generally a reliable proxy for need.104  The statute 
failed to give any help to widowers who were left destitute by their widows’ wills, but did aid 
some widows who were not needy at all.105  The court stated that a gender neutral statute could 
serve the same purpose just as well, and therefore under Orr the statute was not justified for the 
purpose of aiding needy spouses. 
With respect to the purpose of reducing economic disparity between husbands and wives, 
the court declared that similarly to the purpose of assisting needy spouses, the statute was both 
over- and under-inclusive.106  That is, some wives had not suffered economic discrimation, and 
some husbands were worse off economically than their wives.107  In addition, the court noted that 
in the realm of estate law, at least, women generally received better treatment than men.108  
Finally, the court stated that the structure of the statute and its legislative history showed that the 
legislature did not enact it with the goal of reducing economic disparity, but rather intended to 
provide for widows who had no property rights during their marriage and thus were dependent 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 989-90. 
103 Id. at 990. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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upon their husbands for support, even after the husband died.109  For these reasons, the court held 
that the dower statute was not substantially related to the purpose of reducing economic disparity 
between husbands and wives.110 
The Court of Appeals of Indiana delivered another analysis of dower in 1997 in the case 
of Montgomery v. Montgomery, which reconsidered the result in Parson.111  In Montgomery, the 
estate attacked a statute which protected assets in a widow’s share of the estate from certain 
creditors but did not extend the same protections to widowers.112  The court stated that the 
challenge it faced was similar to that in Parson, “but is brought in the present day context which 
is no longer analogous to the cultural climate that existed more than twenty years ago.”113  
Although the court conceded that potential economic hardships still existed for widows, it found 
that “it can no longer be said that ‘there can be no dispute’ that the widow faces greater financial 
difficulties.”114  The court acknowledged continuing inequality in men’s and women’s wages, 
but pointed out that the job market was no longer “inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the 
lowest paid jobs.”115  The court found that the state’s policy of providing a surviving spouse with 
a portion of the decedent’s estate in order to relieve the state of the need to support the surviving 
spouse could be accomplished in a non-discriminatory manner, and extended the protection of 
the statute to widowers as well as widows.116 
Michigan’s dower statute first faced appellate review in In re Estate of Miltenberger in 
the state Court of Appeals in 2007.117  James Miltenberger was married to Sharon Miltenberger 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
111 677 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 581. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 581-82. 
117 737 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. App. 2007). 
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when he died in 2004, but before he died he transferred the marital home and his office without 
Mrs. Miltenberger’s consent, and left an estate worth less than $9,000.118  Mrs. Miltenberger 
elected to take her statutory dower interest, as her husband’s will left nothing to her.119  Sandra 
Swartz, Mr. Miltenberger’s daughter from a previous marriage, challenged the election, arguing 
that Michigan’s dower provision violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions.120  The court first pointed out that the Michigan Constitution expressly allows for 
dower, and that two provisions of the constitution should not be read to conflict with each other 
if at all possible.121  The court applied the proper Equal Protection analysis, asking whether the 
statute was substantially related to an important government purpose.122  The court noted that 
Kahn v. Shevin upheld a statute which provided widows but not widowers a financial benefit, 
and followed the dissent from Boan in distinguishing the dower statute from the statute at issue 
in Orr.123  The court also pointed out the lack of explanation given in Stokes, but did not address 
the Court of Appeals of Indiana’s arguments in Montgomery.124 
Turning to the cases which upheld dower, the court stated that it found Rincon persuasive 
because of Florida’s similar constitutional provision explicitly allowing for dower.125  The court 
also agreed with Baer that the statute serves the purpose of reducing the economic impact of 
spousal loss “upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden,” and 
that it is a legitimate goal to support widows who would have a difficult time supporting 
                                                 
118 Id. at 515; In re Estate of Miltenberger, 753 N.W.2d 219, 232 (Mich. 2008). 
119 Miltenberger, 737 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Mich. App. 2007). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 516. 
122 Id. at 517. 
123 Id. at 517-18. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 519. 
16 
 
themselves.126  Therefore, the court upheld the dower statute, and Ms. Swartz appealed to the 
state Supreme Court.127 
The Supreme Court first granted leave to appeal, then reversed itself and denied leave 
after hearing oral arguments.128  Three justices wrote or joined concurring opinions explaining 
why they would uphold the dower statute.129  A fourth justice wrote in favor of overturning the 
statute, joined by one other justice, while the remaining two justices did not join any of the 
opinions.130  All of the justices agreed that the dower law is subject to intermediate scrutiny, 
because it discriminates on the basis of gender.131  Therefore, the proponent of Michigan’s dower 
statute held the burden of demonstrating that it is substantially related to an important 
governmental purpose. 
Justice Corrigan wrote the chief opinion in favor of upholding the dower statute.132  She 
stated that Michigan’s dower provision serves the dual permissible purposes of supporting needy 
spouses and remedying past economic discrimination against widows.133  Despite the fact that 
Michigan has retained essentially the common law form of dower, the Justice held that the 
purposes behind the law have been updated as first the constitutional convention of 1961 and 
then the state legislature in 1998 considered abolishing dower.134   
Justice Corrigan conceded that dower is both over- and underinclusive for achieving 
these objectives, yet argued that dower reflects genuine differences between men and women, 
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and is not merely based on stereotypes or overgeneralizations.135  She found that women have 
less earning power than men, tend to live longer, and may have relied on their inchoate dower 
rights during the course of their marriages.136  Furthermore, she noted that women working full 
time in Michigan on average earned about 71.3% of what men earned, compared to a national 
average of 77.3%.137  For these reasons, Justice Corrigan stated that the distinction between 
widows and widowers contained in the dower statute is based on more than archaic 
stereotypes.138   
Justice Corrigan also emphasized that Michigan’s laws are not amenable to gender-
neutral application, unlike the statute in Orr.139  Because the situation in Orr already involved 
individualized hearings, there was no need for generalization, but the same cannot be said of 
Michigan’s dower statute.140  Justice Corrigan further stated that although the legislature could 
introduce a gender neutral statute, only the legislature could determine the feasibility of such a 
law.141 
Justice Corrigan then discussed the situations in which dower is a useful option for a 
widow to have.  Those circumstances are limited to cases where the husband transfers real estate 
without his wife’s consent, and leaves a minimal estate for her elective share to operate 
against.142  Therefore, Justice Corrigan argued that although dower is underinclusive of the group 
of needy widows or those who have been discriminated against, it helps in cases where the 
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elective share provision does not protect the widow.143  Concerning the statute’s 
underinclusiveness towards the group of needy widowers, Justice Corrigan suggested that a wife 
transferring property could sell it at a discount in order to reserve a one third life estate in the 
property for her husband in case she should predecease him.144 
Justice Corrigan concluded that dower serves constitutionally important ends that would 
not be equally served by a gender neutral statute without additional burdens to the state.145  She 
also concluded that dower could not be eliminated without compromising the effort to aid 
disadvantaged women.146  While not really satisfied with the dower statute, Justice Corrigan 
stated that the court could not force upon the legislature a new scheme, and expressed skepticism 
that a gender-neutral dower system would even be feasible.147  She pointed out that there is no 
mechanism in place by which to judge whether a surviving spouse is sufficiently needy to 
require the assistance of dower, and that extending dower rights to husbands would interfere with 
vested property rights.148 
Justice Cavanagh’s dissent noted the Orr court’s statement that statutes that discriminate 
on the basis of gender “carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ 
of women and their need for special protection.”149  He agreed with Justice Corrigan that the 
correct level of scrutiny is to ask whether the dower statute is substantially related to an 
important government purpose, but pointed out that the federal Supreme Court has applied this 
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test particularly strictly when dealing with marital laws.150  He also accepted that the statute 
serves important government objectives.151 
Justice Cavanagh did not agree, however, that the dower statute is substantially related to 
its goals.152  He argued that statistics showing that twelve percent of women over the age of 
sixty-five lived in poverty in 2004 compared to only seven percent of men over sixty-five were 
insufficient justification for using gender as a proxy for need.153  He noted that the federal 
Supreme Court has refused to uphold gender discrimination even when based on statistics.154  He 
further pointed out that if twelve percent of women over the age of sixty-five live in poverty, the 
dower statute is overinclusive by approximately eighty-eight percent of women, while at the 
same time failing to protect seven percent of men.155 
Justice Cavanagh then attacked the statute’s use of gender as a proxy for need.  He stated 
that nondiscriminatory means could provide support for needy spouses.156  Furthermore, he 
argued that the statute is poorly crafted to achieve its intended goal, as dower only provides 
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assistance in limited circumstances.157  For these reasons, Justice Cavanagh concluded that 
Michigan’s dower statute is not substantially related to important government purposes.158 
B. An Answer to the Question 
The question is whether Michigan’s dower statute is substantially related to important 
government objectives.159  The best answer is that the statute is aimed at important government 
objectives, but is no longer substantially related to meeting those goals.  The legislature intended 
for the statute to support needy spouses and remedy past discrimination.160  The federal Supreme 
Court has upheld these as important government purposes in the past.161  The problem is that the 
dower statute is vastly overinclusive, substantially underinclusive, and generally ineffective.   
As Justice Cavanagh pointed out in the Miltenberger case, any widow can claim dower, 
regardless of her financial situation.162  On the other hand, even if a widower has no independent 
means of support and his wife was wealthy, he cannot take dower.  According to the statistics 
cited in Miltenberger, twelve percent of women over the age of 65 live in poverty, and seven 
percent of the men over sixty-five also live below the poverty line.163  As a preliminary matter, 
these statistics are insufficient to base the dower statute on because they refer to the entire 
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population above the age of sixty-five, rather than to widows and widowers.  Also, the 
legislature’s idea of “needy” surviving spouses may include some who are not technically living 
in poverty.  
More importantly though, these numbers point out how grossly inaccurate the dower 
statute is for reaching its target beneficiaries.  The numbers suggest that the vast majority of 
those for whom taking dower is an option are not those intended to benefit from it.  Even if a 
greater proportion of widows over sixty-five live in poverty than the class of women over sixty-
five in general, and even if the legislature intended to help more than just those widows left in 
poverty when their spouses die, quadrupling the twelve percent cited in Miltenberger would still 
mean that half of the women able to claim dower do not need it.   
It would be astonishing if only half of the people able to claim dower were actually 
intended to benefit from it.  Yet even fifty percent efficiency does not seem sufficient for a 
statute to be called “substantially related” to its goal.  If welfare were as haphazardly targeted to 
assist the needy as dower is to assist needy surviving spouses, the government might just pay all 
African- and Hispanic-Americans, because those two groups have higher poverty rates than 
whites or Asians.164  Granted, the dower statute is less absurd because it does not involve direct 
payments from the government, and it also involves gender which receives less Equal Protection 
scrutiny than racial distinctions.165  But aside from any racial aspect, such a policy would be 
attacked from every side as being grossly inefficient.  The fact that it is not the government’s 
money at issue in the probate arena does not justify such inefficiency.  
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In addition to benefitting a large number of people who are not the primary focus of the 
statute, the dower statute leaves a sizeable portion of those who actually need help with nothing.  
Granted, a smaller percentage of men over sixty-five live in poverty compared to women, and 
there are a larger number of women over sixty-five to start with, but surely the population of 
needy widowers is not so small as to justify overlooking it entirely.166  Justice Corrigan’s 
suggestion that a wife can reserve a life estate in any property that she transfers during marriage 
is entirely unhelpful.167  As she herself points out, dower is chiefly useful when one spouse 
attempts to disinherit the other.168  If society could count on all spouses to provide for each other 
voluntarily, there would be no need for a dower statute at all. 
Another problem with the dower statute is that it is based on completely outmoded 
expectations about how wealth is held.  Dower developed in the middle ages when the main 
source of wealth was land, so it gives the widow an interest in her husband’s lands.169  But today 
the only land most families own is their home, and they are likely to have more assets in 
personalty than realty.170  Even where the husband holds income producing real estate, a one-
third life interest is often insufficient to support a widow.171  In most cases then, dower will not 
provide the surviving spouse with a substantial amount of support.  Dower provides a bare 
minimum amount of protection from total disinheritance in most cases, to be sure.172  But it is 
such a small amount of protection that it is almost only useful in cases of intentional 
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disinheritance.173  In this context, “useful” merely means that dower provides a very small 
amount of protection in comparison to Michigan’s elective share, which provides almost no 
protection whatsoever.    
Michigan’s dower statute is grossly overinclusive, worryingly underinclusive, and 
generally unhelpful for those it does include.  The only way dower could reasonably be said to 
bear a substantial relation to its objectives is if there were no non-discriminatory alternatives.  
Justice Corrigan expressed strong skepticism that just such an alternative exists, but in fact the 
code upon which Michigan’s legislature based the EPIC statute contains just such an 
alternative.174  “Where, as here, the [Government's] ... purposes are as well served by a gender-
neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of 
sexual stereotypes, the [Government] cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”175 
III. Alternatives 
The EPIC statute generally tracks the language of the Uniform Probate Code.176  The 
UPC eliminated dower and curtesy, but the UPC’s elective share provision provides a surviving 
spouse with protection against disinheritance.  Under the UPC, the surviving spouse is entitled to 
take fifty percent of the value of the “marital-property portion of the augmented estate.”177  The 
marital property portion is determined by the length of marriage.178   
The key is the composition of the augmented estate, which includes not only the 
decedent’s probate estate (that is, property still in the decedents name when he or she died) but 
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also nonprobate transfers that the decedent made to others.179  This provision covers property 
owned or owned in substance by the decedent that transfers outside of probate, including joint 
tenancies, POD accounts, insurance policies.180  It also encompasses transfers of property to 
which the decedent retained the right to possession or enjoyment.181  Therefore, if the decedent 
kept her assets in a joint account in an attempt to transfer them automatically at death to keep the 
assets out of probate and away from the surviving spouse, the UPC will still count those assets as 
part of the augmented estate.  Similarly, a spouse cannot transfer away the marital home to avoid 
leaving anything to the surviving spouse without actually vacating the home.   
The UPC’s elective share provides protection against deliberate disinheritance, but 
extends this protection to personal property and not merely real estate.  Consequently, it does a 
much better job of supporting needy spouses than Michigan’s dower statute.  Additionally, a 
gender-neutral statute such as the UPC will naturally provide some remedy for past economic 
discrimination against women.  A gender neutral statute gives a surviving spouse a certain 
percentage of that property, but that same percentage will mean a larger amount of actual 
property when the husband dies than when the wife dies.  Assume that a husband owns seventy-
five percent of marital property, and that the marriage has lasted more than fifteen years so that 
the UPC calls for the surviving spouse to receive fifty percent of the augmented estate, minus the 
share that the surviving spouse already owns.182  If the husband dies first, the wife’s elective 
share is twenty-five percent of the augmented estate (fifty percent minus the twenty-five percent 
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she already owns), but if the wife dies first the husband receives only a supplemental amount 
because he already owns more than his share of the augmented estate.183 
Nor is the UPC the only possible solution.  As Michigan is currently the only state in the 
country that has dower but does not extend it to men, there should be as many as forty-nine other 
models to choose from.  For example, Ohio provides the option of dower to both spouses.184 This 
is not to suggest that the Michigan courts should force any of the available gender-neutral 
options upon the legislature.  As Justice Corrigan stated, the legislature is in a much better 
position than the courts to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various 
options.185  However, the fact that there are a variety of non-discriminatory options available  
means that Michigan’s dower statute should not be upheld as somehow representing the best 
possible solution to a thorny problem. 
IV. Conclusion 
Michigan’s dower statute violates the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause.  It 
simultaneously protects far too many and far too few to achieve its purposes, and what protection 
it gives is often inadequate.  Furthermore, despite Justice Corrigan’s protestations to the contrary, 
there exists in the UPC’s elective share provision a workable gender-neutral alternative which 
would provide greater protection than dower.  Although the courts should not press any specific 
alternative upon the legislature, the existence of a variety of alternatives shows that there is no 
excuse for continuing to cling to the outmoded, discriminatory relic that is Michigan’s current 
dower statute.  Striking down the dower statute will provide the legislature with the necessary 
impetus to undertake reform and implement a more effective, non-discriminatory law. 
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